Has The EU Pushed Integration Too Far And Too Fast?
John Kay
A few years ago, I heard an after-dinner
speech from a European statesman, a person who has played a leading
role not only in the political life of his own country but in the
councils of the EU. The speaker that evening lauded, to general
agreement, Europe’s values — its culture, its solidarity — and the
quality of its institutions. He went on to stress the need for the union
to propagate these values and institutions more widely.
The discomfiture I
felt was shared by some of those sitting with me at the table. My
problem was that I could have put similar words into the mouths of some
of the most unpleasant figures in world history. The EU that
the speaker described was an imperialist project. Those who proclaimed
the British empire used to sing: “Wider still, and wider, may thy bounds
be set. God who made thee mighty, make thee mightier yet.” Britons may
still sing “Land of Hope and Glory” but they no longer take the words
seriously. Yet the expansion of the EU embraced a similar vision.
For the builders of modern Europe, wider union has been as important as closer union. Greece was
hastily admitted in the hope of sustaining its fragile democracy after
the end of military rule; Spain and Portugal followed soon after. Every
post-communist state with passably honest and democratic institutions,
and some without, has secured admission. The ambitious project of
creating monetary union between France and Germany was extended, by
lowering admission standards, to include most EU members. The principal
qualification for membership of a European club has been the desire to
join.
Of course, there are big differences
between the Europe of the 21st century and the empires of the 19th and
20th: notably, traditional imperialists did not seek the consent of
those they colonised and they suppressed most forms of democratic
expression. Yet Greeks today might not perceive these differences as
being particularly large.
So the question is
whether, like so many imperialist projects throughout history, the
European project has stretched its territorial boundaries beyond the
limits it can plausibly sustain. That question is highlighted by the two
existential problems the EU faces today: the geopolitical confrontation
with Russia, and the troubled relationship between peripheral economies and the eurozone.
The boundaries of
western Europe have been pushed as far east as at any time in history,
save for the best forgotten precedent of the Nazi occupation of most of
the continent in 1941-42. The Ukraine crisis
tests how far implied promises of political, economic and ultimately
military support in that extension will be maintained when called on.
The Baltic states have reasonable cause to feel nervous about the
solidity of the commitment of their new allies.
Few people can now doubt that it was a
mistake to let Greece join the euro in the first place. And this is not
just a matter of economics — the fudged data, profligate spending and
unpayable debts. The central Greek problem is that the country’s
political institutions are not sufficiently mature to effect competent
administration or economic management, or to engage in a responsible
manner with the institutions of western Europe. And Greece is not the
only member state of the EU to which that critique could be applied.
The empires of history have generally
collapsed from overstretch, which led to restive populations on the
peripheries, and then to doubts about the wisdom of the project in the
home country itself. These symptoms are recognisable in Europe today.
The EU has achieved its successes by always pushing integration a little
further and faster than its institutions would easily support or its
populations readily accept.
Perhaps that ambitious strategy has now been
taken a step too far.
This column was first published in the Financial Times and on John Kay’s homepage.
John Kay is Visiting Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics and a regular columnist for the Financial Times.
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